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Strategic Acquisition of Agricultural Lands in Sub-Saharan Africa: Determinants of Country Targeting Behavior
Introduction and Problem Statement 
In recent years, the confluence of rising prices of energy and global food prices has led policy 
makers in emerging and developed countries to explore alternative strategies for energy and 
food security. Some countries facing pressing energy problems are exploring and investing in 
bio-fuels to diversity their energy portfolio (Borrasand Franco 2010). Bio-fuels offer a less 
polluting alternative, vis-à-vis fossil fuel-based energy sources. However, bio-fuels production at 
a large scale is feed-stock and therefore land-intensive. At higher levels of land values, they may 
become feasible only with some form of subsidy. Similarly, countries stressed by rising global 
food prices and limited domestic capacity to accommodate rising food demand are seeking to 
alleviate their land resource constraints. 
Energy and food price shocks have led to growing interests in investing in prime 
farmlands. This is particularly so in Sub-Saharan Africa where over 40 million hectares have 
been acquired by international investors. Large-scale land deals come in the forms of leases, 
concessions or purchases, contract farming and rural and agricultural infrastructure 
investment—such as investment in irrigation systems and roads (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 
2009).
This phenomenon, dubbed “land grabbing” by those who question its legitimacy, has 
raised questions about the nature, consequences and equity implications of long-term land 
transactions (Obertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 2010, Hallam 2009, von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 
2009). The choice of the term “land grabbing,” as opposed to “strategic investment in land” is 
driven by the concern that many of the African countries that participate in land deals 
themselves have serious energy and food insecurities, and by the fact that they may not have 
the capacity to understand the gravity of these long-term decisions. 
The complex decision making process that leads to these international land acquisitions is 
not well understood. Key to understanding this process is knowledge of the motivations and 
behaviors by targeting and host countries. This area of inquiry is the main focus of this study.
Study Objectives
(1) Develop a theoretical model to explain the targeting behavior of investors, the behavior 
of host countries and the critical factors that determine the probability that a country will 
be targeted; and
(2)    Implement an empirical model to explain the land acquisition process and the primary 
determinants of international land acquisitions. 
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Model
The Host Country Land Management Problem
The host country maximizes the value of agricultural lands as follows:
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where V is in-country value of agricultural land,     is net price for local agricultural products, f(.) is the production 
function, (   ) is land input, (  ) is a vector of other agricultural inputs, (  ) is land quality, (  ) is technology, (  ) is 
other factors that determine the value of agriculture, (   ) is net export value of agricultural products, (r) is lease value 
of per unit land at time (t) and location (z), and ( ) is per unit opportunity cost. The conduction for agricultural land 
value maximization and land management is:
The Targeting Country Land Management Problem
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where ϑ is the net value of production from acquired lands, all other variables are as defined previously. The 
conduction for maximization is:
Econometric Model and Estimation
The two conditions above define the supply and demand behavior. With data on independent variables indicating the 
determinants of country targeting behavior, we estimate the following logit econometric model:
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where T = 1 if a country is targeted for land acquisition and T = 0 otherwise;	  is a vector of determining factors for a 
country to be targeted, and   is a vector of coefficients.  The log-likelihood function is:
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The logit econometric model is:
Study Results and Conclusion
Table 1: Logit Model Results for Likelihood of Land Transaction in a Host Country.
• It is expected that an area such as international land where well funded buyers get to deal 
with developing country government or local representatives, corruption would be a 
relevant factor  in determining where deals flow. We find that investors are not attracted or 
detracted from places with high levels of corruption 
• Processed agricultural exports attract interest in land investment, but not processed 
agricultural imports, suggesting export record is relevant.
• Current level of transportation infrastructure in the host country seems unimportant, 
supporting the notion that investors often are not averse to building necessary 
infrastructure, such as roads.
• Current level of host country productivity of agriculture and other sectors productivity 
seem unimportant, suggesting perhaps that potential productivity is what is important to 
both investors and host country deal makers. 
• Investments are attracted to places with adequate rainfall, significant amount of idle lands, 
prior trading experience, significant value added and market activity, and existing high 
capital investment, but low irrigation investments, in agriculture.
• Investments are attracted to places with strong property rights, perhaps because investors 
want to ensure that their ownership rights are protected. 
• Investments tend to be attracted to places with low income countries with high degree of 
undernourishment. This perhaps explain a host country motivation.
• Investments tend to be attracted to places with higher human development index, perhaps 
suggesting that some investors at least need advanced human capital to make their 
investments yield production returns.  
Hypothesized Causal Factors from the Literature 
The literature identifies the following reasons for increased interests in African agricultural 
lands.    
￿ 2007-2008 Global Food Price Hikes: (Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen 2010,  Aarts2009, 
Duangklad 2010, Borras& Franco 2010, GRAIN 2008, Mann & Smaller 2010, FMECD 2009).
￿ Rising Energy Prices and Derived Demand for Biofuels: (Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen 
2010, Duangklad 2010, Borras& Franco 2010,  Aarts2009, von Braun & Meinzen-Dick 2009, 
Mann & Smaller 2010).
￿ Growing Long-term Commodity Prices Volatility: (Mann & Smaller 2010).
￿ Increased Opportunity for Speculative Land Investment:(Duangklad 2010, Borras& 
Franco 2010, GRAIN 2008, Mann & Smaller 2010).
￿ Increased Pressure on Natural Resources in Targeting Countries: (von Braun & Meinzen-
Dick 2009).
￿ Africa’s Favorable Climatic Conditions and Geographic Proximity: (von Braun & Meinzen-
Dick 2009).
￿ Limited Food Supply and Production Capacity of Investor Countries: (von Braun & 
Meinzen-Dick 2009, Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen 2010, Mann & Smaller 2010).
￿ Availability of Relatively Abundant and Cheap Land, with Less Water Constraint:
(Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 2010, von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009, Mann and 
Smaller 2010).
￿ Diminishing Development Aid from Donor Countries: (Cotula et al. 2009).
￿ Increased Production Costs Differentials: (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). The dependent variable is whether international land acquisition occurred in country or not; the independent variables 
are: percent of agricultural land to total land (AGLANDPCT), net agricultural trade (NETAGTRA), agricultural value added 
(AGVALUE), constrained soil fertility (SOILFERT), processed agricultural import (PROCAGIM), processed agricultural export 
(PROCAGEX), total agricultural export (TOTAGEX), per capita gross domestic product (GDP), degree of property rights 
(PRORIGHT), corruption perception index (CORRUPT), depth of hunger (HUNGER), agricultural capital (AGCAPITAL), gross 
non-food productivity index (GROSNFOODI), gross food productivity index (GROSFOODI), paved roads, (PAVEDW), human 
development  index (HUMANDEV), land equipped for irrigation (LANDIRR), and undernourishment (UNDERNURR). 
Variables Coefficient P-val.
Agricultural land (% of total land) -0.135***   0.002    
Net agricultural trade 0.004**   0.042     
Agricultural value added 0.1404*     0.068    
Rainfall 0.0049*    0.081    
Area of severely constrained soil fertility 0.001   0.158    
Processed agricultural import -0.023   0.709    
Processed agricultural export 0.060**    0.037     
Total agricultural export -0.036    0.726    
GDP per capita -0.002**   0.022    
Property right 0.087***    0.001     
Corruption 0.691    0.547    
Agricultural capital 0.001***    0.002      
Gross food productivity index 0.093    0.149    
Gross non-food productivity index 0.047    0.206    
Paved ways -0.0001   0.297     
Human development 0.314***    0.011     
Land equipped for irrigation -0.058***    0.008    
Undernourished 0.089*    0.068    
Constant -41.002*    0.092    
R-squared 0.692
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CONCLUSION: the above suggest that the bulk of the investments are at least tied to the 
potential for agricultural production, agricultural exports to address food security  and markets 
elsewhere and food security domestically. Results also buttress the need for host country 
awareness of the motivations of investors. 